Natural Resources Conflict And Conflict Resolution Pdf

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Edwin E. Krwnpe and Lynn McCoy. Introduction Set guidelines for selecting task-force members Define responsibilities and procedures Use the "four levels for support" to reach consensus Use a positive approach to identify issues and set goals Use a team rotation technique to develop management actions Conclusion References.

Local disputes over land, water, forests, and fisheries can contribute to broader social conflicts. Climate-induced migration can spur competition for resources such as cropland and freshwater, and stress or undermine existing social institutions Fearon and Laitin While significant empirical research has focused on diagnosing the links between natural resource competition and violent conflict, much less analysis has focused on the dynamics of how resource competition can be transformed to strengthen social-ecological resilience and mitigate conflict.

Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in Natural Resource Management

Local disputes over land, water, forests, and fisheries can contribute to broader social conflicts. Climate-induced migration can spur competition for resources such as cropland and freshwater, and stress or undermine existing social institutions Fearon and Laitin While significant empirical research has focused on diagnosing the links between natural resource competition and violent conflict, much less analysis has focused on the dynamics of how resource competition can be transformed to strengthen social-ecological resilience and mitigate conflict.

Focusing on this latter theme, this review synthesizes empirical evidence from cases in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In particular, we draw lessons for practice by showing how understanding the factors that influence collective action can yield insights about the policies and strategies needed to promote cooperative and equitable outcomes. We present three propositions about the dynamics of conflict and collective action in natural resource management, followed by recommendations for action.

Our main argument is that interventions can shift the incentives towards cooperative and equitable management of resource competition and reduce the likelihood of an escalation of social conflict and violence. Our key objective is to underpin this argument with a synthesis of evidence to suggest the major areas where such interventions may be effectively made. We pursue this objective by analyzing recent experiences and cases within an analytical framework designed to assess the role of collective action in natural resource conflict and cooperation Ratner et al.

The paper is organized as follows. We begin with an overview of the role of collective action in conflict and cooperation over natural resources, using the aforementioned analytical framework. We identify factors that affect the incentives for cooperative and equitable management of resource competition, which can be addressed to reduce the likelihood of broader social conflict and violence or its escalation.

The subsequent sections outline ten recommendations for action, grouped in the following three windows for intervention: governance and policy-level interventions; strategies to support natural resource management institutions in promoting collective action; and, routes to influence the arenas in which disputes are played out. The concluding section highlights the need to systematically assess the outcomes of such interventions as they affect local livelihoods, resilience, and future conflict risk.

In this section we provide three propositions and a framework to understand the role of collective action in conflict and cooperation over natural resources. As the framework is introduced and explained in more detail elsewhere Ratner et al.

In other words, how does such a framework help identify factors that affect the incentives for cooperation in natural resource management? And how does it help elucidate pathways for engagement by diverse social actors to reduce the likelihood that resource competition contributes to broader social conflict and violence? Collective action comprises concerted group effort to achieve a shared goal. This can be done directly by group members or on their behalf by an organization Marshall Collective action is pervasive in societies, although the strength and forms of collective action vary greatly, from sporadic events to highly structured and long-standing organizations.

Although collective action is often discussed as a good thing, associated with harmony and mutual benefit, it is not necessarily advantageous to everyone or benign. Collective action institutions can be highly inegalitarian; groups can act collectively to exclude others; and the outcome of their action can be negative e. Indeed, many forms of violent conflict can be seen as the clash between groups who are each acting collectively.

This extends from short-term confrontations among competing resource users where violence is avoided, to sustained, violent confrontations involving diverse political factions, ethnic groups, or state actors. Disputes within groups are not covered in our definition of conflict, as we consider these part of the normal, even salutary, functioning of collective action institutions Van Laerhoven and Andersson Nor do we focus on interstate conflict or war.

Research on the role of natural resources in contributing to conflict and the potential for cooperation among states has been more thoroughly reviewed elsewhere Le Billon , ; Ross ; Barnett and Adger ; Welsch ; Lujala ; Scheffran et al. While acknowledging that subnational conflict and instability can contribute to interstate conflict, particularly in border zones or where transboundary resources are concerned, our focus instead is on the role of natural resources in local livelihoods, and how this is manifested in the dynamics of conflict and cooperation.

By referring to dynamics we accentuate the temporal dimension, recognizing that over time peaceful situations can become conflictive, conflicts can be resolved and transformed into more cooperative forms of interaction, and post-conflict environments can return to conflict. This framing also recognizes that cooperation and competition can exist in parallel among the same groups of actors, for different resources e.

This means sustaining the productivity of the resource systems at hand and the livelihood benefits these generate, but also the adaptive capacity of social institutions to manage or cope with change in ways that do not lead to social breakdown and violence.

At times, more fundamental transformation of regimes governing resource access and use is required to restore equitable livelihood benefits or address long-term risks to environmental services.

Research is available to explore the links between collective action, conflict, and resilience in the domain of developing country natural resource management, but it is not often articulated in these terms. As a way of organizing these related strands of research, we offer the following three propositions:. Framework for recognizing importance of collective action in natural resource management.

Source: Meinzen-Dick et al. Building on these propositions, the primary focus of this paper is to understand how interventions that promote collective action can help shift the incentives towards cooperative and equitable management of resource competition, thereby reducing the likelihood of broader social conflict and violence, and strengthening the foundations for social-ecological resilience.

We apply an analytical framework designed to assess the role of collective action in natural resource conflict and cooperation Ratner et al. The framework, which builds on the Institutional Analysis and Development IAD framework that Ostrom , and others have used as the basis for analysis of the environmental commons, has four main elements: context, collective action institutions, action arena, and outcomes see Figure 2.

The context comprises characteristics of the resources and resource users including livelihood assets and vulnerabilities , as well as governance arrangements understood as distribution of power, representation, and mechanisms of accountability.

Collective action organizations such as water user associations, community forestry organizations, and farmer cooperatives provide rules and norms to guide behavior regarding resource access, use, and benefits. To the extent that other actors respect these institutions, they may direct and constrain their actions accordingly. Conceptual framework on resource conflict, collective action, and social-ecological resilience, showing 3 windows for intervention.

Source: Ratner et al. Arenas exist at multiple scales, and may be both formal and informal: a traditional village council, a mediated conflict resolution process, a private sector investment review, formal proceedings in national courts or parliamentary bodies, or a transboundary policy dialogue, to name just a few.

The patterns of conflict and cooperation that emerge have outcomes that in turn may influence the context, collective action institutions, and characteristics of the action arena in future rounds. See Ratner et al. Recognizing the agency of diverse actors linked across multiple scales highlights that there are multiple potential windows of intervention in any given case of resource competition. Broadly speaking, we identify three such windows for positive engagement, as illustrated in Figure 2.

In subsequent sections of the paper, we explore each of these three windows in turn, and elaborate corresponding action recommendations:.

Numerous actors have a role in governance improvement. National governments may reform policies addressing resource management and allocation specifically or mechanisms for public participation and public sector accountability more generally. Development cooperation agencies may finance or provide technical assistance or invest in capacity building to aid such reform efforts. Civil society actors, both domestic and international, may advocate for policy and institutional change, including through broad-based social movements.

International bodies such as the World Trade Organization and private sector initiatives such as the Forest Stewardship Council also shape resource governance. For all such actors, there are opportunities to improve the governance context in ways that promote collective action for equitable resource management. Below we summarize four priorities for policy and legal reforms to 1 clarify resource tenure, 2 enable collective action among small-scale producers, 3 strengthen both statutory and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, and 4 proactively address inequalities in natural resource access and management.

Many failures of tenure reform result from a rush to impose new tenure regimes without sufficient understanding of local realities and existing tenure arrangements.

A forestry decree banning illegal logging in Afghanistan failed to address the interests of key stakeholders; as such, it reinforced a view of the government as out of touch, ineffectual, and corrupt — all of which undermined governmental legitimacy Nichols and Al Moumin In Mali and Tanzania, national policies to promote agricultural development have deprived herders of their traditional pastoral land, resulting in local farmer-herder conflicts Benjaminsen and Ba ; Benjaminsen et al.

The Rwandan government introduced legal reforms and a major campaign to formalize land tenure with the objective of increasing productivity but failed to develop processes that could accommodate the complexity of small, dispersed land holdings and traditional norms for intergenerational transmission of land ownership Bruce ; Pritchard As research in Nepal has shown, the process of codifying water rights can also stimulate conflicts where customary arrangements had previously functioned relatively harmoniously Pradhan and Pradhan The experience of developing forestry regulations in Liberia demonstrates the benefits of an inclusive, locally adapted, and deliberative process for reforming management of natural resources essential to livelihoods and the national economy Brottem and Unruh ; Altman et al.

The work of the Barza Intercommunautaire intercommunity meeting or discussion , which successfully mediated interethnic land disputes between and early in the North Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo similarly illustrates the ability of community level institutions to diffuse potential resource conflicts Clark In Zambia, collective agreements governing animal grazing and bush fires have reduced conflict over land rights, including protecting the interests of poorer community members Ajayi et al.

Where population movement is rapid, as is the case with internally displaced persons or international refugees in the wake of conflict, or with returnees being resettled after years of dislocation, it may be desirable to introduce provisional resource tenure and access arrangements before confirming statutory rights Unruh and Williams It is also useful to note how shifts in tenure may affect the dynamics of cooperation.

Governments in many countries have come to recognize that local bodies are often able to manage natural resources more effectively, efficiently, and democratically than central governments, and have implemented policy reforms to transfer management authority to local governments and resource users.

Devolution of rights and responsibilities to local groups is an important step in establishing a legal framework to foster collective action, but does not guarantee that successful collective action will emerge. Rather than simply withdrawing from the local arena, governments must continue to play a role by offering policies that support local rules and authority, sanction local organizing, support the property rights of local users, and ensure the enforcement of such rights Meinzen-Dick et al.

While collective action can proceed — and is often successful — when undertaken outside the ambit of statutory law, laws and regulations can create an enabling environment that formally recognizes, supports, and protects collective action among small-scale producers. In Nepal, for example, the forestry law allowed the establishment of community forest user groups that have the authority to manage community forests, collect revenues, and decide how to use the revenues Sanio and Chapagain An increasing number of fragile and conflict-affected states, including Liberia, Mozambique, and Cameroon, have adopted legislation supporting community forestry Harwell States can also foster collective action by investing in capacity strengthening of local communities and ensuring that financial support is provided in a way that stimulates rather than undermines collective action Meinzen-Dick et al.

Several factors can enable partnerships and collective action at multiple scales to take advantage of market opportunities including foreign direct investment in agriculture and integrated, international value chains Castro and Stork Farmers displaced by large-scale, capital-intensive farms struggle to recover from economic losses associated with the acquisition of their land unless there are safeguards in place to prevent this Robertson and Pinstrup-Anderson Policies that support small-scale producers to tap into organic and fair trade niche markets can provide incentives for collective action to boost local incomes and livelihoods.

The organic agri-food system has been transformed from loosely coordinated local networks of producers and consumers into a globalized system of formally regulated trade which links socially and spatially distant sites of production and consumption Raynolds Certification schemes including the Forest Stewardship Council for forest products and the Marine Stewardship Council for seafood fill a similar role by providing internationally recognized norms for sustainable production and trade.

For small-scale producers, the barriers to certification can be high King and Venturini , as well as the costs of ongoing monitoring Mutersbaugh But policies that provide incentives for sustainable resource management through certification and higher prices, and assist small-scale producers to take advantage of such opportunities, can ultimately increase household profitability and reduce conflict, as producers focus on how to cooperate towards the collective goals of achieving and maintaining certification.

Efforts at legal and judicial reform and institutional capacity strengthening often focus separately on statutory versus customary mechanisms for conflict resolution and justice, sometimes ignoring one side of the spectrum altogether.

In most cases, however, statutory and customary mechanisms are highly complementary Sanginga et al. Failure to recognize and legitimize this legal pluralism is at the root of many resource tenure conflicts Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan In postcolonial Africa, laws governing natural resource management were formalized based primarily on Western legal norms, and most countries emphasized formal conflict resolution mechanisms even in instances where these had little or no legitimacy in the eyes of local resource users Mamdani While statutory law and judicial institutions have significant benefits that include the potential for bridging across widely disparate social groups, including non-local and foreign actors, customary conflict resolution mechanisms offer distinct advantages as well Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan ; van Koppen et al.

These include:. The challenge in legitimizing and strengthening customary conflict resolution mechanisms is to preserve such benefits while ensuring complementarity with the formal legal and judicial system, including foundation principles of human rights. For example, this means mandating equity in access to local natural resource conflict resolution mechanisms with regards to ethnicity, caste, and gender — areas where customary institutions may be highly inequitable van Koppen et al.

It also means monitoring and mitigating the risk that customary institutions legitimize resource capture by local elite, a problem that in Sierra Leone, for example, contributed to broad social conflict, and ultimately civil war Fanthorpe ; Unruh and Turray In addition to legal and regulatory reforms, capacity building efforts can mitigate against such risks by improving the equity and effectiveness of traditional institutions.

Many conflicts occur along lines that Stewart terms horizontal inequalities, those between social groups contrasted with vertical inequality by income strata across a whole society. Such groups may be defined by region, ethnicity, religion, or occupation. While horizontal inequality alone is insufficient to explain violent group mobilization, it can be an important motivating factor when an economically marginalized group is also politically excluded.

Horizontal inequality can be reduced through targeted measures aimed at political, economic, and social inclusion. Political inclusivity is not assured simply by the implementation of democratic processes such as elections Stewart Stewart notes that every observed case of sustained civil conflict lacks political inclusivity, whereas well-known peace-making regimes, such as post-Pinochet Chile, and South Africa under Mandela, have all adopted inclusive polices.

Economic and social inclusivity can be achieved by ensuring balance in group access to benefits from government expenditures, and access to education, health services, water and sanitation, housing, and consumer subsidies.

Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution

Drawing on experiences in more than 20 countries, Helvetas learned that any complex management of natural resources will likely have to address the issues of ownership of natural resources, allocation of power to manage and control natural resources and the sharing of natural-resource benefits. Many political contexts are therefore inevitably affected by conflicts. Land, water, forests and livestock as well as marine life are primary sources of income for a good part of the population of developing countries. In many cases, natural resources are considered common goods or are utilized by several users. Resource management always involves cooperation but also different — often competing — interests. To prevent violent conflicts, assess risks and foster adaptation as well as innovation, we advocate for increased analysis of interest and needs of actors, as well as their power relations and rights that influence resource management in different settings. Evidence shows that good analysis and subsequent measures allow projects to increase their impact and contribute to conflict prevention.


The interpretation of the resource-conflict link that has become most publicized—​the rebel greed hypothesis—depends on just one of many plausible.


Natural Resources and Conflict

Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: The interpretation of the resource-conflict link that has become most publicized—the rebel greed hypothesis—depends on just one of many plausible mechanisms that could underlie a relationship between resource dependence and violence.

He has obtained his LL. The article analyses how the formal legal systems in Ethiopia and Kenya marginalised and prevented traditional forms of resolving conflicts over natural resources. Both countries best illustrate two rapidly growing economies in transition. However, in Ethiopia and Kenya, conflicts over natural resource have to be understood in relation to their respective histories, politics and legal frameworks. Ethiopia maintained its freedom from colonial rule with the exception of a short-lived Italian occupation from to

Conflict over natural resources — such as land, water, and forests — has for ages been widespread. Whether it be a local dispute between farmers and ranchers or an international clash over shared resources, people everywhere compete for the natural resources they need to ensure or enhance their quality of life.

1. Introduction

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Course Descriptions & Current Offerings

 - Через пятнадцать минут все страны третьего мира на нашей планете будут знать, как построить межконтинентальную баллистическую ракету. Если кто-то в этой комнате считает, что ключ к шифру-убийце содержится еще где-то, помимо этого кольца, я готов его выслушать.  - Директор выдержал паузу.

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За восемь месяцев работы в лаборатории Фил Чатрукьян никогда не видел цифр в графе отсчета часов на мониторе ТРАНСТЕКСТА что-либо иное, кроме двух нулей. Сегодня это случилось впервые. ИСТЕКШЕЕ ВРЕМЯ: 15:17:21 - Пятнадцать часов семнадцать минут? - Он не верил своим глазам.  - Это невозможно.

Попытался что-то сказать, но голоса не .

 Он не предложил вам больницы поприличнее. - На этой его чертовой тарантайке. Нет уж, увольте. - Что же случилось утром. - Я все рассказал лейтенанту.

Погрузив ладони в складки жира на плечах шефа, она медленно двигалась вниз, к полотенцу, прикрывавшему нижнюю часть его спины. Ее руки спускались все ниже, забираясь под полотенце. Нуматака почти ничего не замечал. Мысли его были. Он ждал, когда зазвонит прямой телефон, но звонка все не .

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